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The structure of the U.S. agricultural sector has changed throughout our history.  Particularly
important from a policy perspective, this evolution has left us with  an agricultural sector significantly
different than existed in the 1930’s when the foundation of much farm commodity policy was established.
Farm numbers appear to have stabilized at just over 2 million. Most farms today are small and account for
only a modest share of agricultural production, even if they control three-fourths of the country’s
farmland.  The largest farms operating on the other quarter of farmland grow more than 60 percent of
food that enters commercial channels.  Almost two thirds of all farm operators do not regard farming as
their main occupation, but rather live on farms as a retirement or residential lifestyle choice.  Many of you
are by now familiar with the Economic Research Service (ERS) farm typology, that categorizes farms into
homogeneous groupings based on what farmers surveyed say is their main occupation.  The typology is
one way of looking at the diversity that characterizes American farm structure today.   Recent ERS work
on the definition of a farm safety net uses the typology to take explicit account of the marked differences
in aspirations and circumstances across farm households when examining how income goals might be met
(Gundersen, et al., 2000).
The typology is based on the occupation of operators and the gross sales class of the farms
combined.  It is constructed using annual national farm survey data collected by USDA.  As such, the data
provide a statistically reliable picture of American farming.  The typology identifies five groups of small
family farms (sales less than $250,000) and two groups of larger family farms, plus a non-family farm
group (Hoppe, et al., 1999).
•  Limited resource.  Any small farm with gross sales less than $100,000, total farm assets less than
$150,000, and total household operator income less than $20,000.  Limited resource farmers may
report farming, a non-farm occupation, or retirement as their major occupation.
•  Retirement.  Small farms whose operators report they are retired.
•  Residential/lifestyle.  Small farms whose operators report a major occupation other than farming.
•  Farming occupation/lower-sales.  Small farms with sales less than $100,000 whose operators report
farming as their major occupation.
•  Farming occupation/higher-sales.  Small farms with sales between $100,000 and $249,000 whose
operators report farming as their major occupation.
•  Large family farms.  Farms with sales between $250,000 and $499,000.
•  Very large family farms.  Farms with sales of $500,000 or more.
•  Non-family farms.  Farms organized as non-family corporations or cooperatives, as well as farms
operated by hired managers.
This typology now forms the basis for disaggregating ERS reporting on farm household and business
performance.
The typology provides a perspective on farm structure that allows examination of its implications
for farm policy.  Traditionally, the farms most active in the policy debate are those that produce what are
known as “program” commodities (wheat, feedgrains, cotton, rice, sugar, dairy, peanuts) addressed by the
New Deal legislation that forms the foundation for today’s farm legislation.  Examining the characteristicsof farms by category in the typology, it is seen that the smaller family farms are more likely to specialize
in non-program commodities, particularly in beef cattle, which often have low labor requirements
compatible with off-farm work and retirement (Chart 1).  Even when cash grain program commodities are
an emphasis, these operations are generally too small to qualify for much in the way of Federal benefits.
Farms with the most at stake in the agricultural policy debate are family farms whose operators are full-
time farmers, not the limited-resource, retirement, or residential/lifestyle farms.  Non-family farms may
participate in Federal programs, too, of course, but number about 40,000 and account for only 2 percent of
all farms.  About one quarter of these farms receive payments under the terms of the 1996 farm bill.
Family farms run by a full-time farmer comprise roughly a third of the nation’s 2.1 million farms.
While many of these 750,000 farms are alike in their focus on program commodities, there are differences
among them that are key in understanding their preferences for farm policy.   Significantly, it turns out
that farms even within the same typology category are different from one another in their ability to cover
their costs of production.  Perhaps not surprisingly, cost competitiveness has an important bearing on the
impact that policy has on a farm.  One might reasonably expect, then, that a farmer’s preferences for one
kind of policy or program over another would be strongly related to the expected impact of an alternative
on his or her own operation.
A look at the distribution of the economic costs of wheat production provides a good illustration
of the variability in financial position across farms.  Considered here are farms that specialize in wheat,
thus having much at stake in wheat policy outcomes and accounting for just over one third of all U.S.
wheat production.  Economic costs include total cash costs plus an allowance for depreciation, along with
an imputed return to management and to unpaid labor of the operator and family.  With the focus on long
term economic viability, there are clear distinctions in financial performance across the estimated 35,000
U.S. wheat farms in operation in 1999 (Chart 2).  Classifying wheat farms by economic cost per dollar of
revenue, a measure of financial efficiency allows identification of three distinct groups.  The most
financially efficient farm businesses cover their economic costs, i.e., cost per dollar of revenue is below
one.  Financially efficient (“low cost”) farms account for 35 percent of all wheat farms and produce just
over half of all the wheat grown on specialized farms.  In proportion to their production share, wheat
farms in the financially efficient group receive close to 50 percent of all Federal payments to wheat farms,
but for most of them, market revenue alone was sufficient to cover all costs.  At the other extreme are the
least efficient (“high cost”) wheat farms, with costs more than half again as large as returns, cost per
dollar of revenue is 1.5 or higher.  These account for 33 percent of all wheat farms but for just 14 percent
of wheat production.  Other sources of income or equity are required for these farms to remain viable.
Farms in the “mid cost” efficiency group, representing the final third of wheat farms, with costs per dollar
of revenue between 1 and 1.5, account for the remaining 32 percent of wheat production and represent
farms that are close to being financially viable.
These marked differences in cost structure have policy significance that is often overlooked.  Most
farm policy analysis is conducted in an aggregate framework, one that essentially imputes identical cost
structure across farms.  But this implicit assumption of homogeneity masks considerable differences in
the way farms of differing cost structure experience the effects of policy (Chambers, 1992).  Financially
efficient producers tend to favor policy that makes the most of their cost advantage (often stemming from
economies of scale) by permitting them to produce without restrictions on output, acreage or crop choice.
Direct payments that provide unit returns in excess of their marginal costs encourage production beyond
the point that would maximize profit in a free market.  Higher cost farmers, on the other hand, tend to
prefer supply controls.  These farms save proportionally more than their low cost brethren for each acre
taken out of production simply because their costs per acre are higher.  And, when supply restrictions
raise prices, more of their costs are covered by market returns.  The unfettered production/direct payment
policy penalizes them, relative to the low cost farms, because their costs are unchanged but market priceis driven down as low cost producers expand supply.  Direct payments may or may not fully compensate
for the difference between market price and their higher production costs.
These cost differences are particularly important considering elements of the farm policy debate
now emerging.  One would expect that low cost producers would prefer the approach of the 1996 farm
bill that frames policy today.  Higher cost producers, however, would prefer a return to supply
management.  Certainly, both these viewpoints are currently found within the farm community.  This
division between high and low cost producers, though, does not break down along the lines that
traditionally have divided sides in the farm policy debate.  First, low cost production is not the exclusive
preserve of large and very large farms (Chart 3).  In fact, there are sizable portions of each farm typology
group that cover economic costs, although it is true that financially efficient farms are more likely to be
found among the larger operations.  Second, the geographic location of a wheat farm does not determine
its cost position.  While there are differences across regions in the distribution of high, mid, and low cost
farms, there are farms in each category in each region.  Chart 4 considers the entire population of wheat
farms, whether specialized or not.  Third, commodity specialization does not determine financial
efficiency. For example, it is the case that about one third of farms that specialize in corn break even
(Chart 5), similar to wheat.  And, looking across the range of program commodities, all are characterized
to a greater or lesser extent by the same marked differences in production costs across farms seen in the
case of wheat.
These very real differences in financial efficiency and the differences they imply for the way that
farmers experience the effects of policy are likely to make it difficult to reach consensus on the
appropriate form of policy intervention.  This is true even if all are agreed on the goal of raising farm
income.  Fundamentally, farm politics is about the distribution of benefits, which is why the devil is in the
details of farm program design and implementation.  Program designs that do not account for these
differences across farms will likely not be politically sustainable.  Selecting an aggregate income or
revenue goal as a target for determining policy intervention without considering these distributional
consequences is therefore not likely to provide a lasting farm policy solution, if in fact that is what is
desired.  Of course, the alternative of targeting policy, whether by cost differential or another structural
farm characteristic, has not been the practice in the U.S.  Here, targeting would involve the cost of
identifying each farmer’s place in the distribution of cost of production, requiring quite a bit of
information gathering and also creating the incentive for gaming by program participants.  And there
could be a political cost to making clear the distribution of benefits of farm policy.  Nonetheless, targeting
could theoretically match policy preferences to these important structural differences across farms.
Conflict over agricultural policy might be avoided if programs could be designed so that targeting
occurs voluntarily because it follows a participant’s self-interest.  For example, in the U.S. it has been the
experience that large and very large family farms idle very little land in the Conservation or Wetland
Reserve Programs.  On the other hand, farms whose operators are retired or who do not regard farming as
their main occupation account for close to 40 percent of the acreage in the programs although they
account for only about 20 percent of all farmed acreage.  To the extent that these operators are also among
the relatively large portion of mid- to higher-cost farms in their categories, then, they may have come out
ahead if the amount it would have cost to keep the now-idled land in production exceeds the conservation
program payment. Because participation in the reserve is voluntary, low cost producers are not compelled
to forego their financial advantage in commodity production. So, voluntary mechanisms may offer some
hope for resolving the tension between high and low cost producers and could avoid incurring the
administrative and political costs of gathering information necessary to target program delivery based on
individual farm cost of production(Chambers, 1992).The U.S. is not alone in facing very different policy preferences within a diverse domestic
agricultural sector.  The countries of the European Union face similar divides between more and less
financially efficient farmers.  These differences can help explain the European sentiment in favor of
“multifunctionality,” which is the notion that farmers could be compensated for producing something in
addition to farm crops or livestock, even if it is difficult to define the nature of these non-commodity
outputs (such as landscape amenities or cultural values).  Presumably, if payments made for non-
commodity outputs were high enough, then higher cost producers might be insulated from the financial
pressure they experience if market prices fall below their cost of production.  Some support in this country
for so-called “green” payments would appear to be predicated on the same thinking.   Any
“multifunctional” payment scheme would presumably have to pass muster with respect to international
commitments to trade liberalization, which could prove problematic if payments are not clearly linked to a
well-defined non-commodity farm output.
 Confidence in highly aggregated measures of financial performance and wellbeing (such as
national net farm income) ought to be tempered by knowledge of the diversity in the sector.   There are
systematic underlying differences between high and low cost farms.  Financially efficient farmers make
more effective management decisions on production practices and technologies, marketing strategies, and
financing (Morehart, Kuhn, and Offutt, 2000).  The skill of the operator is strongly related to his or her
age and education.  Still, some mid-cost farmers may also be constrained in their ability to lower input
costs if their farms are sited on unfavorable soils or in areas with difficult weather or pest problems.
Policy that recognizes these differences and is tailored to reducing production costs has perhaps the
greatest potential to level the domestic playing field.  The investments in research and education that
underpin improvements in agricultural cost competitiveness also conform to international commitments to
avoid distorting trade.
It is easy to say that one-size-fits-all policy is no longer appropriate for a diverse farm sector.  It is
another matter to find agreement on policy that recognizes those differences.  However, an appreciation of
the heterogeneity in farm structure and performance can lead to understanding of the roots of differences
in aspirations across farm households and in program impacts across farms. To the extent that economic
self-interest influences farmers’ policy preferences, more divides the farm community than ideology.  But
also bear in mind that agricultural policy outcomes can be influenced by considerations outside the farm
sector, most notably by concerns about the Federal budget exposure created by farm programs.  A
constrained budget climate may lend support to advocates of supply control, as in the late 1980’s. In more
free-spending times, direct payments appear tolerable.   Even so, consensus will likely be hard to come
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